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*For comment to Actg DCI  
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Executive Secretary

*3/18/83*

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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March 17, 1983



MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG  
Assistant to the Vice President for  
National Security Affairs

MR. L. PAUL BREMER, III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

LIEUTENANT COLONEL W. RICHARD HIGGINS  
Assistant for Interagency Matters  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

MS. JACKIE TILLMAN  
Executive Assistant to the United  
States Representative to the  
United Nations  
Department of State

COLONEL GEORGE A. JOULWAN  
Executive Assistant to the  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Pentagon

SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting -- Friday, March 18, 1983 at  
1:00 p.m.--2:30 p.m. (U)

A National Security Planning Group meeting has been scheduled for March 18, 1983, in the Situation Room, to discuss the following: the status of INF and Lebanon. The attached background papers for the INF portion are sensitive and should be provided to the NSPG participants -- Eyes Only. Papers for the Lebanon portion will be distributed separate from this memo. (S)

*Michael O. Wheeler*  
Michael O. Wheeler  
Staff Secretary

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SECRET/SENSITIVENEXT STEPS IN INFExecutive Summary:

The key issues are: 1) whether to move in the near term (either during this round or between rounds); and 2) which negotiating move would best serve our interests.

The near-term prospects of reaching an acceptable INF agreement are remote. Therefore, our challenge for the remainder of this year is one of political management to ensure -- in the absence of a negotiated settlement -- that deployments begin on schedule. Failure to obtain either deployments or an adequate agreement would be a severe setback for the U.S. and the Alliance.

Basing countries (with the exception of the Belgians) and most other NATO Allies desire an early U.S. proposal for an interim agreement. The British have suggested moving before the current round ends. The Germans and the Italians are also anxious to see a new U.S. initiative.

Timing

The immediate issues, therefore, are:

-- Whether we should make a new move in the negotiations in the near-term or hold fast to our current position, deferring the possibility of movement to the summer, or later.

-- If we move in the near term, should we do so before the end of the negotiating round on March 29 or between the rounds in April/May?

Options:

Any substantive move must conform to the President's four basic criteria: equality, non-compensation for British and French systems, non-transfer of the Soviet INF threat from Europe to Asia, and verifiability. Zero-zero remains the most desirable ultimate outcome. Among the range of interim solutions are the following four possibilities:\*

\*JCS review of these options has not yet been possible; further assessment of the military implications of each option is required.

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Option A: Soviet Reductions to Zero Over Five Years

We would offer not to deploy if the Soviets agreed to destroy all of their longer-range, ground-based INF missiles at a rate of 20 percent of the total per year, over a five-year period. We would accept a dwindling Soviet INF advantage for five more years in return for a guarantee of ultimate elimination of an entire class of weapons.

Option B: Phased Reductions to Zero and/or Equal Levels

We would offer, in addition to Option A above, to terminate deployment at discrete levels if the Soviets agree to reduce to an equal level, and to negotiate eventually to zero. Equality would be achieved at any one of several successively higher levels.

Option C: Equal Warhead Ceilings

We would propose equal global ceilings of 300 warheads on INF missile launchers. All other elements of our current position would remain unchanged. 300 warheads would meet our minimum military requirements and provide enough missiles to justify including all five basing countries. The Soviets would reduce from more than 1000 SS-20 missile warheads\* to 300.

Option D: Comprehensive Proposal

We would propose changing not only the number of warheads from zero to some higher number, but also other elements of our current position, such as: units of account (launchers and warheads); globality (from a global limit to separate European and Asian sub-ceilings); aircraft (exclusion to inclusion); and U.S. shorter-range systems (exclusion to inclusion). This option could be presented either as a package or in a series of individual steps.

Ambassador Nitze has proposed one such approach. He suggests equal limits for Europe of 100 U.S. and Soviet launchers and 300 warheads, and separate limits outside Europe of 80 launchers and 240 warheads. There would be a limit of 150 on

\* There are currently 1053 SS-20 warheads on launchers, and 248 SS-4s and 5s.

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U.S. F-111s and FB-111s in Europe, and a higher ceiling, at a level to be negotiated, on Soviet Backfire, Badger, and Blinder bombers in Europe. Shorter-range systems on both sides (including U.S. PI's) would be frozen.

Tactics

To manage the deployment issue effectively, we need a plan that covers the rest of 1983. This could include several of the options in sequence. If it is decided to make a new move in the near term, we would need to consider just how to introduce it. This could be done in several ways: by Ambassador Nitze, by public announcement, by a bilateral approach to the Soviets, by calling a special meeting of the negotiators during the break, by extending the current round, or by reconvening the negotiations early (with the appropriate publicity).

Before making a new move, we will, of course, need to consult fully with our Allies. We will also need to take key members of Congress into our confidence.

If we decide to offer a new proposal, a basic tactical issue is whether to launch an initiative publicly first, for example in a Presidential speech, or whether to explore it initially in private with the Soviets, and only subsequently announce it or background it. A possible middle position might be to reveal just the principles of a new proposal in public, saving the substantive details for private discussion with the Soviets, or to move with the Soviets just prior to a public announcement.

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**SECRET**SECRET/SENSITIVENEXT STEPS IN INFIntroduction

This paper considers what we might do over the next months to support our INF objectives. It discusses whether a new U.S. initiative in the INF negotiations is needed now or at some later point, and if so, what we might do and how. The advantages and disadvantages of several possible proposals for interim arrangements are explored.

U.S. Objectives

The near-term prospects of reaching an acceptable INF agreement are remote. Therefore, our challenge for the remainder of this year is one of political management to ensure--in the absence of a negotiated settlement--that deployments begin on schedule. To accomplish this, we need to sustain European public support for deployments. Consequently, the content, manner, and timing of any moves we make in the negotiations should be designed to maintain Allied backing, especially in the five basing countries. We also need to consider Asian sensitivities.

Failure to obtain either deployments or a satisfactory agreement would be a severe setback for the U.S. and the Alliance.

Soviet Objectives

The Soviets have said repeatedly they will not accept a zero-zero solution or a negotiated outcome that legitimizes U.S. deployments at any level. The Soviets seek to prevent U.S. deployments and, failing that, to maximize the political costs to the U.S. and NATO. They are likely to continue emphasizing UK/French systems while making further negotiating offers designed for maximum public impact. In Asia, there have been indications that the Soviets are preparing for significant increases in SS-20 deployments\*. The Soviets have made a number of public and private threats about the consequences of

\* Recent intelligence estimates indicate that the Soviets may be preparing to deploy from 117 to 144 additional SS-20 launchers in Asia.

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US deployments, including numerical increases in SS-20s, adding longer-range cruise missiles, and emplacements "near the borders of the US."

Viewed strictly in the context of the numerical disparity in INF systems, our relative position is unlikely to improve after we deploy. The Soviets will have no difficulty in maintaining their current margin of military advantage in missile capabilities as the U.S. deploys (see Table 1). Nevertheless, once some U.S. missiles are in place, we will have strengthened the deterrent value of NATO's theater nuclear forces and reinforced the linkage between theater and strategic forces. The need for "strategic coupling" was a primary rationale for the 1979 decision.

Conceivably, within the framework of their overall relationship with the United States, the Soviets could see possible benefits in reaching an agreement--though almost certainly not at zero-zero, and probably not at any other level of genuine U.S.-Soviet equality. The history of INF and other arms control negotiations suggests that the chances for reaching an agreement may improve when the Soviets come to accept that deployments cannot be derailed. Even at that point, however, the Soviets will probably continue to try to divide the Alliance by exploiting anti-nuclear sentiment in the West.

#### Allied Views

All basing countries (with the exception of the Belgians) and most other NATO Allies have indicated their desire for an early U.S. proposal for an interim agreement, although we have not yet consulted with them on specific options or a political game plan for the rest of the year. In particular:

-- The British have suggested moving before the current round ends. They prefer an equal global number of warheads above zero on each side, with no change in any of the other elements of our present position.

-- Following the elections, the German Ambassador has told us on instructions that Bonn remains just as anxious as before to see a new U.S. initiative. In a letter to the Secretary,

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Genscher has also underlined the point. Chancellor Kohl has now said publicly that "it certainly is the time for new proposals..."

-- The Italians and Dutch have also expressed support for an early U.S. move.

-- Asian anxieties are focused on not solving our European problem by transferring it to Asia. The Japanese seek reductions in SS-20s in the Far East.

### Timing of a Move

The immediate issues, therefore, are:

-- Whether the U.S. should make a new move in the negotiations soon or hold fast to our current position, deferring the possibility of movement to the summer, or later.

-- If we move in the near term, should we do so before the end of the current negotiating round on March 29 or between the rounds in April/May?

### The principal arguments for moving in the near term are:

-- Leaders of the principal deploying countries recommend that the U.S. show flexibility in the near-term, in order to convince their publics that we are negotiating in good faith. European expectations of an interim solution have been heightened by recent U.S. statements, by publicity surrounding the Vice President's trip, and by last summer's "walk in the woods." To disappoint these expectations now might cost us considerable support in the months ahead.

-- By capitalizing on the favorable effect of the German elections, we would be perceived as moving from strength and not simply responding to pressure.

-- Growing frustration with the Administration's approach to arms control is not restricted to Europe. Movement in INF could strengthen the Administration's credibility.

-- If movement is deferred until close to December 1983, proponents of delaying deployments indefinitely may argue that more time is needed to negotiate the new proposal.

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-- We need to regain the initiative from the Soviets and undercut Soviet claims of flexibility (the Andropov proposal) versus U.S. rigidity.

-- We should begin preparing Europeans for the reality that some level of U.S. deployments will be necessary even if arms control succeeds.

The principal arguments for remaining firm are:

-- Zero-zero is the ideal arms control position. Once we begin discussing finite numbers above zero, sustaining any alternative position for very long may be difficult. If we move too soon, or to a position that lacks endurance, the Soviets may simply pocket any concession we offer and wait for Western impatience or political pressure to force yet additional moves. Past negotiations have demonstrated that staying power and the capability to match the other side in armaments are essential ingredients in negotiating with the Soviets.

-- Pressures on our deployment program will intensify during the year. It may be wiser to hold possible concessions for use later, when the need is greatest, or to fashion a new position that leaves room for further movement later when new pressures develop.

-- The Kohl-Genscher election victory appears to confirm the wisdom of firmness and patience.

-- Opposition to GLCM deployments in Britain may increase significantly; delaying a move until just before the UK elections might best ensure support for deployments there.

-- The Soviets have already rejected, in advance, interim solutions involving equal U.S.-Soviet ceilings, or indeed any U.S. deployments.

-- When we put an "interim" proposal on the table, we will be open to attack for advocating a "deployment" option. Left-wing forces will be able to focus opposition on this point.

Whether to move during the current round or between rounds

If it is desired to unveil a new position in the near term, we need to narrow our focus to the merits of moving

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before the current round ends (March 29) or in the period between rounds.

Moving before the round ends has several advantages. Presenting an initiative while the negotiations are still in session adds credibility and restores Allied unity sooner. Moreover, there is a risk that at the end of this session the Soviets will publicly charge us with intransigence and announce they will not return to Geneva unless our position changes. In such circumstances, a response between rounds would appear to result from this heavy handed Soviet tactic. Since last summer, we have had an opportunity to study the merits of various proposals for movement, and there is adequate time for consultation and deliberation prior to March 29. However, if we are not prepared to lay out a detailed position before the end of the round, we might just present the fundamentals of a proposal while leaving elaboration in treaty language to the next round. Specific details should in any case be left to the confidentiality of negotiations.

There are, however, some disadvantages in moving too quickly. We should not present a proposal until all concerned agencies have had a chance to assess it thoroughly. Moreover, we must not appear to be rushing under pressure, either Allied, Soviet or domestic. To rush out a new proposal to meet an artificial deadline could convey weakness -- even panic -- and would only invite stronger pressures later. Certainly, the German election outcome gives us time for more deliberate consideration. Moreover, we would not have time between now and March 29 to prepare fully a comprehensive option for detailed presentation. Therefore, lack of time before the end of the round might incline us, on those grounds alone, toward simpler options. In addition, without a detailed position, we would not as effectively withstand the intense scrutiny of the media.

#### Possible Moves

Any substantive move must conform to the four basic criteria laid down by the President in the American Legion speech: equality of rights and limits between the US and USSR, no consideration of British and French strategic systems, no shifting of the threat from Europe to Asia, and effective measures for verification. Zero-zero remains the most desirable ultimate outcome. Any deviation from the deployment plan would result in a reallocation. The smaller the number, the more difficult it would be to maintain deployments in all five basing countries.

Among the range of interim solutions are the following four possibilities:

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-- A: Termination of U.S. deployments now if the Soviets will phase down to zero over five years;

-- B: In addition to A, offer to stop deployments at discrete levels if the Soviets agree to reduce to that level and subsequently negotiate on eventual elimination of all missiles;

-- C: Equal warhead ceilings;

-- D: Comprehensive proposals.

Option A: Soviet Reductions to Zero Over Five Years

We would offer not to deploy if the Soviets agreed to destroy all of their longer-range, ground-based INF missiles at a rate of 20 percent of the total per year, over a five-year period.

Summary Evaluation: Instead of giving the Soviets one year to destroy all of their SS-20s, as proposed in our draft treaty, destruction would be phased over a five-year period. We would accept a dwindling Soviet INF advantage for those years in return for their agreement to eliminate an entire class of weapons.

Advantages:

-- This move would preserve the President's four principles and be fully consistent with the 1979 dual-track decision.

-- It would preserve the zero option longer, and give us time to evaluate the strength of European sentiment for further movement.

-- It could be an ideal first step in a series that would enable us to make several small moves as the recurrent pressures to show flexibility inevitably unfold.

-- It could be proposed quickly, in a Presidential speech in which the Soviets would be challenged to respond.

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Disadvantages:

-- This option would be widely perceived merely as zero-zero by another name, and not substantive enough to demonstrate flexibility.

--In the course of negotiation, it might evolve into the kind of moratorium Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers has suggested: i.e., postponement of deployments in exchange for a limited Soviet reduction without commitment to zero. It may be argued that if NATO can live with this Soviet monopoly for five more years, then we should be able to accept the present situation or the Andropov proposal (0/162 in Europe).

-- Opening the issue of the deployment schedule could lead to an unravelling of the 1979 decision.

-- Although there would be strong incentives to the counteractions if the Soviets decided at some point to renege on reductions, other political and practical considerations at the time might make it difficult to resurrect deployments once we have agreed to wait five years.

Option B: Phased Reductions to Zero and/or Equal Levels

As in Option A, we would propose to halt U.S. deployment plans upon agreement by the Soviets to reduce in phases (20% each year for five years). If, however, agreement based on reductions to zero cannot be reached, we would agree to equal levels, consistent with our phased deployment plans\*, and provided the Soviets would negotiate on the eventual total elimination of the entire category of INF missiles. Thus, we would be willing to stop after our initial deployment, if the Soviets reduced to that level, or at any of the subsequent levels our program will reach. Equality would be achieved at any one of several successively higher levels.

Summary Evaluation: By putting forth a two-part option we would dramatize our own flexibility and, if rejected, Soviet inflexibility. If they won't phase down to zero over five years, then we will settle for equality at each subsequent level that our deployment plan would reach -- preferably at the lowest such level (100 warheads on 52 launchers). Even our initial deployment numbers may be adequate militarily. These

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See Table 2

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minimum numbers are not far from zero and are quite low in relation to our full plan (572 warheads on 224 launchers) and also to the existing Soviet deployment. By identifying the several phases of our deployment plan we will put the Soviets in the position of having to reject a whole series of equal outcomes and not just a single such outcome. Other features of our present position would be unchanged.

Advantages:

-- This option is consistent with the President's four principles.

-- It conveys a sense of great flexibility and avoids the single number proposal (on which the negotiations could again become stalemated).

-- It emphasizes the great reluctance with which we greet the prospect of having to climb a ladder of successively higher deployment levels as a direct result of Soviet refusal to accept our proposal for zero or an outcome as close to zero as possible

-- It helps to pin responsibility for our deployment on the Soviets.

-- It provides substantial maneuver room, enabling us to play out the details of the proposal over several months as we define the phases of our deployment following the initial deployment scheduled for December.

Disadvantages:

This option has the same disadvantages as Option A. In addition:

-- This further modification would reopen the issue of the deployment schedule within the Alliance and could lead to postponement or actual cancellation of the deployments by several countries. It would in any case ensure that the current Alliance preoccupation with INF would be sustained through most of this decade.

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-- It insists that the Soviets reduce to zero as a goal; however, the Soviets have repeatedly said they will never accept. It may appear to be too small a step, and disappoint the expectations which have been raised of a more substantive U.S. move.

-- This complex option could strengthen public suspicions that negotiations are merely a cover for deployments, especially as we reach higher and higher levels.

-- The Germans, British and Italians would immediately have to face the certainty of deployments this year, even if the Soviets accept the first tranche and the negotiations succeed. This could worsen the political pressures we seek to alleviate.

-- This move is premature and might better be made toward the end of this year, closer to deployments.

#### Option C: Equal Warhead Ceilings

We would propose equal U.S.-Soviet ceilings, on a global basis, of 300 nuclear warheads on longer-range, land-based INF missile launchers. All other elements of our current position would remain unchanged.

Summary Evaluation: As long as there are equal warhead levels, 300 is a minimum number which meets our political, military, and economic requirements. This level provides enough missiles to justify including all five basing countries. Militarily, 300 warheads meet NATO's minimum operational requirements, including the effective size for combat units. Deploying in all five basing countries complicates Soviet defense planning by maintaining a broad missile attack azimuth and retains the political advantages of multiple country basing. It permits a mix of ballistic and cruise missiles with greater military utility and deterrent value than a single missile type.

#### Advantages:

-- While responsive to Allied suggestions for an evolution in our position, this change remains consistent with the 1979 NATO Integrated Decision Document (IDD) and the President's

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four principles. Therefore, it could be proposed quickly in a Presidential speech.

-- If the Soviets agreed to reduce to 300 warheads, we would have achieved a major political and military success. The Soviet missile level would be cut by 1000 warheads, or more than two-thirds. We would reach equality, which our current deployment plan will be unable to do (see Table 1).

-- The resulting level of 100 SS-20s would be well below the Andropov offer of 162 SS-20s confined to Europe with no mention of the SS-20s in Asia.

-- It is better to pick a realistic minimum number than to appear to be drawn in stages to a higher number. Such a position could be sustained for a long period of time.

-- Although the Soviets are unlikely ever to agree to zero-zero, we could present this solution as an interim step while continuing negotiations on zero-zero.

Disadvantages

-- The Soviets are likely to respond that they have proposed 162 systems in Europe and the US is trying to protect a significant deployment. They will focus attention on non-inclusion of UK and French systems, our weakest argument with the public.

-- There is no guarantee that a proposal at the 300 warhead level would maintain a commitment from all five basing countries. An agreement at any level below 572 warheads will necessitate reallocation, with an uncertain outcome. The Belgians and Dutch, in particular, might well opt out of deployments on their territory, pleading political difficulties.

-- At 300, the Soviet would have fewer INF warheads than in December 1979. It could then be argued that with Soviet reductions to 300 there is no longer a need to deploy PII and GLCM.

-- At 300 warheads the Germans, British and Italians (at least) will immediately have to face the certainty of deployments this year, even if the negotiations succeed. This could worsen the political pressures we seek to alleviate.

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-- 300 may be too big a jump from zero. We should start with a much lower number (say 100) to emphasize that the Soviets are driving us upwards from zero.

Variants of Option C:

- (1) A lower limit of 100, rather than 300, warheads.
- (2) A lower limit of 225 warheads.
- (3) A combined limit on launchers (100) and warheads (300).
- (4) A European regional sub-limit within a global limit (e.g., 300 warheads in Europe; 600 warheads world-wide). This would permit 100 SS-20s in Asia.
- (5) Zero/zero in Europe; a cap on Soviet warheads in Asia.

Option D: Comprehensive Proposal

A comprehensive approach involves changing not only the number of warheads from zero to some higher number, but also other elements of our current position such as: units of account (launchers and warheads); globality (from a global limit to separate European and Asian ceilings); aircraft (exclusion to inclusion); and U.S. shorter-range systems (exclusion to inclusion). It might be presented either as a package or in a series of individual steps.

Ambassador Nitze has proposed one such approach. He suggests equal limits for Europe of 100 U.S. and Soviet launchers and 300 warheads, and separate limits outside Europe of 80 launchers and 240 warheads. There would be a limit of 150 on U.S. F-111s and FB-111s in Europe, and a higher ceiling, at a level to be negotiated, on Backfire, Badger, and Blinder in Europe. Shorter-range systems on both sides (including U.S. PI's) would be frozen.

If a decision is made to move before the end of the current negotiating round in Geneva, there probably would not be time enough to develop fully the details of a comprehensive proposal. The more time allowed for studying such an approach,

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the more definitive it could be.

Summary Analysis: A limit of 300 missile warheads in Europe is militarily acceptable, although adding launchers is more restrictive. Separate limits of 240 warheads outside Europe are acceptable militarily if countered by an option for U.S. deployments. A ceiling of 150 F-111s in Europe appears to be too low to meet anticipated deployment requirements in an emergency. In addition, negotiating unequal levels of aircraft codifies and legitimizes the current imbalance, contrary to the President's equality principles. If further evaluation confirms the acceptability of equal limits, willingness to negotiate aircraft ceilings might help gain an otherwise acceptable agreement or retain Allied or domestic support.

Advantages:

-- A comprehensive option (of the general type suggested by Nitze) represents a substantial move. Since it addresses Soviet concerns on a number of key points, it would be perceived to be a credible and important negotiating move.

-- It would not deviate significantly from our basic negotiating principles.

-- It would call for reductions in the Far East as well as Europe.

-- It would probably come closer than the other approaches to being the basis for an agreement, in that it would allow higher levels of systems and warheads, and limit aircraft. The "walk in the woods" experience may foreshadow eventual Soviet acceptance of this type of compromise once it is clear that we will persevere in deployments.

-- The option could be strung out over a considerable period, thus gaining us time.

Disadvantages:

-- A global limit of 540 warheads is only marginally less than our current program for 572. Some might complain that this did not represent progress in arms reductions.

-- The U.S. has no program to deploy in Alaska or the Far East. By allowing the Soviets a limited number of SS-20s in

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Asia, we would in effect be compensating them for Chinese missile systems (thus conceivably making it more difficult to sustain our refusal to compensate for UK/French systems).

-- In light of the indications that the Soviets may be developing a potential to deploy another 144 SS-20s in Asia, a regional sub-ceiling, even at current levels, may be unachievable.

-- Equal ceilings at the U.S. level on longer-range aircraft (F-111, FB-111, Backfire, Badger, Blinder) in Europe may be non-negotiable and would be inconsistent with the global principle. Unequal ceilings would violate the principle of equality.

-- If dealt out piecemeal over time, the remaining elements of the package could leak, undermining any tactical advantages of a comprehensive approach. Moreover, the Soviets could pocket the elements they liked and ignore the rest.

#### Variants of Option D

(1) Lower limits (e.g., 75 launchers and 225 warheads in Europe, and 75 launchers and 225 warheads outside Europe).

(2) Higher limits (e.g., 162 launchers and 486 warheads in Europe, and 120 launchers and 360 warheads outside Europe).

(3) Equal limits on LRINF aircraft in Europe (e.g., 150 on each side, or limits at the Soviet level).

#### Combinations

The above options, variants of them, or selected elements, could be presented in a series of steps. Many combinations are conceivable. If several of these steps are acceptable in substance, then we could keep them in mind for later contingency use as we lay out a plan for the entire year. We should anticipate almost immediate Soviet rejection of any approach except, perhaps, the "comprehensive" option. Even that approach may not be enough to sustain negotiations over the rest of this year. Therefore, we may need to have in hand several of these options. The sequence could be slowed down, speeded up, or interrupted, according to the tactical needs.

On the other hand, to have a series of fall-backs prepared in advance virtually guarantees that all positions will be

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used, and probably quickly, either by the negotiators themselves or by a process of leaks. It may, therefore, be better to put forward one option with sufficient substance and stick to it, rather than allowing ourselves to enter a process in which we risk being pushed rapidly from move to move. The nine months between now and the December IOC are actually a relatively short period in which to launch a substantial initiative and fully negotiate it.

### Tactics

To manage the deployment issue effectively, we need a plan that covers the rest of 1983 and takes into account key political events such as the UK elections and the SPD Congress in Germany in the late fall. We need to contemplate where, when, and how we might introduce new substantive positions into the negotiations.

The tactics will depend on what we decide to do substantively. If the decision is to hold fast to our present position, without taking a new initiative now, then we will still need to hold open the option of moving near the time deployments commence. Toward the end of the year, there will be fewer plausible options for movement. An approach with as much substance as the "comprehensive" option would take time to negotiate. To introduce such an option late in the fall might only strengthen pressures to postpone deployments in order to give the proposal a "fair chance" in the negotiation. On the other hand, as deployments begin, one might consider introducing an offer to set equal limits at each "tranche" of the subsequent deployment program.

If it is decided to make a new move in the near term, we would need to consider just how to introduce it. This could be done in several ways: by Ambassador Nitze, by public announcement, by a bilateral approach to the Soviets, by calling a special meeting of the negotiators, by extending the current round, or by reconvening the negotiations early (with appropriate publicity).

Before making a new move, we will, of course, seek Allied support. Coordination with the leaders of the basing countries should precede discussions in the SCG. We should not overlook the Japanese and other Asian friends. We also will need to take key members of Congress into our confidence.

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When to go Public with a New Move

If we decide to offer a new proposal, a basic tactical issue is whether to launch a new initiative publicly first, for example in a Presidential speech, or whether to explore it initially in private with the Soviets, and only subsequently announce it or background it.

The advantage of publicizing a new move first is that we can make a direct appeal to public opinion in a manner and at a time of our own choosing. It both demonstrates U.S. leadership and gives Allied governments something they can exploit immediately. However, with a highly visible move we could be charged with engaging in a propaganda battle rather than a serious negotiation, as we have accused the Soviets of doing.

Negotiating a new proposal privately with the Soviets first has the advantage of both being, and probably appearing, more credible as a negotiating move. The "walk in the woods" experience provides an instructive example of the strong impression a move made in deepest confidence produced on the public when leaked to the press, months afterward. On the other hand, the fact that this episode was inconclusive demonstrates the difficulty of obtaining maximum public benefit from private diplomacy. Moreover, if a move is rejected by the Soviets in private, its subsequent public impact will be undercut, and the Soviets will have had time to prepare their public position in advance.

A possible middle position might be to reveal just the principles of a new proposal in public, saving the substantive details for private discussion with the Soviets, or to announce a proposal at nearly the same time we present it to the Soviets privately.

Further Consideration

The entire NSC will need to evaluate the specifics of the four negotiating options elaborated above. JCS review of these options has not yet been possible; further assessment of the military implications of each option is required.

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TABLE 1

LRINF MISSILES

<u>US</u>		<u>Soviet Union</u>		
<u>Launchers</u>	<u>Warheads-on-Launchers</u>	<u>Launchers</u>		<u>Warheads Launcher</u>
<u>Current Balance</u>				
(0)	(0)	248	SS-4/5	248
		351*	SS-20	<u>1053</u>
				1301
(* 243 Europe/106 Asia)				
<u>Balance Without Agreement (in 1988)</u>				
108 P-II	108			
<u>116 GLCM</u>	<u>464</u>			
224	572	513*	SS-20	1539
(* Includes 16 projected new bases in the Far East, and 2 possible bases at Mozyr.)				
<u>Balance With Equal Warheads</u>				
60 P-II*	60			
<u>60 GLCM*</u>	<u>240</u>			
120	300	100	SS-20	300
(* Illustrative figures)				
<u>Balance Under Nitze Proposal</u>				
100 (in Europe)	292	100	SS-20 (west of 80°)	300
80*(outside Europe)	240*	80	SS-20 (east of 80°)	240
<u>180</u>	<u>532</u>	<u>180</u>		<u>540</u>
(* No deployments currently programmed)				

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TABLE 2PHASED DEPLOYMENT PLAN UNDER OPTION B

	<u>Warheads</u>	<u>Launchers*</u>
<u>Six Months (June 1984)</u>		
UK	32	8
FRG PII	36	36
Italy	16	4
Total	84	48
<u>One Year (December 1984)</u>		
UK	48	12
FRG PII	54	54
Italy	16	4
Belgium	16	4
Total	134	74
<u>Eighteen Months (June 1985)</u>		
UK	80	20
FRG PII	81	81
Italy	16	4
Belgium	16	4
Total	193	109
<u>Two Years (December 1985)</u>		
UK	96	24
FRG PII	108	108
FRG GLCM	16	4
Italy	48	12
Belgium	16	4
Total	284	151

\*(Omits operational spares)

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March 17, 1983

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG**  
Assistant to the Vice President  
for National Security Affairs

**Mr. L. PAUL BREMER, III**  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

**LT. COL. W. RICHARD HIGGINS**  
Assistant for Interagency Matters  
Office of the Secretary of Defense

25X1  
[Redacted]  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

**COL. GEORGE A. JOULWAN**  
Executive Assistant to the Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Pentagon

**MS. JACKIE TILLMAN**  
Executive Assistant to the U.S.  
Representative to the United Nations  
Department of State

**SUBJECT:** Agenda for NSPG Meeting, Friday, March 18, 1983,  
Situation Room, 1:00 p.m. - 2:30 p.m.

Attached are the Agenda items for the NSPG meeting to be held  
Friday, March 18, 1983, in the Situation Room, 1:00p.m.-2:30p.m.

*BT Wheeler*  
Michael O. Wheeler  
Staff Secretary *for*

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**NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING**  
**Friday, March 18, 1983**  
**1:00 p.m. - 2:30 p.m.**

**AGENDA**

- |                                     |   |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| <b>I. Introduction</b>              | <b>William P. Clark</b>                 |
| <b>II. INF Negotiations</b>         |   |
| a. Review of INF Policy and Options | Secretary Shultz                        |
| b. Discussion of Options            | NSC Participants                        |
| c. Summary                          | President Reagan                        |
| <b>III. Lebanon Negotiations</b>    |   |
| a. Review of Policy                 | Secretary Shultz                        |
| b. Fall-Back Military Option        | Secretary Weinberger/<br>General Vessey |
| c. Intelligence Cooperation         | DCI Casey                               |
| d. Summary                          | President Reagan                        |

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